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Abstract: This paper traces the roots of theories on experience and experiencing in
the history of science of the 19th and 20th century. From the concepts of Wilhelm
Dilthey (1833–1911) and others, a phenomenological model of experiencing has been
derived for industrial design around 1990, which is to be published internationally for
the first time in this paper. From a current view, this model does not provide new
opportunities on designing or evaluating user experience. However, it can be used to
bridge theories and findings from the late 19th and early 20th century with current
models of user experience, which are more comprehensive and can be used beyond
the description of experiencing. These models also offer methods for designing,
evaluating and even quantitatively measuring user experience, or have a stronger
focus on emotions.
Keywords: product experience; experiencing; history of science

Introduction
Since about the year 2000, there is a notable increase of considering experience and
experiencing being core issues in design (see Bargas-Avila & Horbaek, 2011 for a review).
Accordingly, design itself is being referred to the concept of experience as one of its bases.
What design actually is, can then be explained from this reference. The question that arises
is whether the choice of the term experience as a central one for design is a temporary
phenomenon, or whether the term is truly suitable to provide the field with a conceptual
foundation that is epistemologically valid and empirically verifiable. In the still short history
of design as an institutionalized discipline, the conjunctures of basic terminologies and
underlying concepts followed the rules of the market in recurring characteristic cycles, as
concisely described by Jonas (1994).
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Already in the 1980s, experience has been cautiously introduced as a core concept in the
academic engagement with industrial design (e. g. Uhlmann 1986). After the Millennium, the
concepts of user experience (UX) became more prominent in research as well as in practice
of design. Today, there is a broad agreement on experiencing being a fundament of design,
thus being part of many design curricula (see Jordan 2000, McCarthy & Wright 2004, Desmet
& Hekkert 2002, Desmet 2003, Hassenzahl 2004, Thüring & Mahlke 2007, Roto et al. 2011,
Wölfel & Thoring 2014).
As it is the case for design research in general, there is also a special notion of experience in
the German academic and design practice. The German translation for experience, both as
the verb erleben and the noun Erlebnis, has a notable etymological background. Its root
refers to the word Leben (to live or life). Erleben and Erlebnis are considered untranslatable
into other languages, leading them to become loanwords for other languages in their heyday
at the beginning of the 19th century (cf. Gadamer 1960/1991, Pongratz 1967). At the end of
the 19th century both terms made their way into the world of science, and until the 1930s
they were a central focus of academic work in several fields.
In German everyday culture and language, the term experience, in the sense of its German
equivalents erleben and Erlebnis, is used to designate particular, mostly sensual events that
stand out from the undifferentiated happenings in everyday life. It is used as a synonym for
feelings. The term has become a value-based one as the zeitgeist caused its clear and rigid
meaning to transform into an amoeba-like notion, which is flexibly usable according to
demand and capable of a diversity of meaning (cf. Bischof 2008:38).
Equally noteworthy as the etymology of erleben is its current standing in academia. If
referred to scientifically outside the design domain, erleben or experience, will most likely be
associated with the discipline of psychology as the science of human experience and
behaviour. Anyone outside the field of psychology will likely expect to find an ample amount
of information on this topic in the field's current literature. However, one might be
disappointed. According to Sichler (1998), the meaning of the term is hardly taken into
account today by the discipline itself, »...in spite of it being a basic concept« of psychology.
He argues:
“...currently, academic psychology does not concern itself either conceptually or
empirically with the human experience. ... Neither today's basic theoretical discussion
nor the current prominent research or inquiry reflects an understanding of this
problem.” (Sichler 1998: 68).

In contrast, prior to the middle of the 20th century, the use of the term of experience or
erleben was flourishing. Researching relevant literature from this period, a third noticeable
feature occurs: the academic preoccupation with erleben or experience has essentially been
a German concern. This aspect may limit the scope of research, but does not truly facilitate
finding a comprehensive overview of research to date and the scope still remains unclear.
Figure 1 depicts a rough historical timeline of academic preoccupation with the concept of
erleben.
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The Trowel – an example for product experience
Prior to further detailing of historical research on experience, one example of product
experience from the literature is referred to. The chosen example for product experience
relevant to design is the trowel by Gert Selle (1997):
“From a time when I had to earn my money as a labourer in construction I remember
that quarrels would sometimes arise for seemingly petty reasons. If, in the morning or
after the break, someone had by mistake picked up the tools of another – a shovel or a
trowel –, they would raise their voices, even fists. The reason became apparent to me
when I realized what that meant: your own tools. A mason needs his trowel and no
other. The handling of a tool of the same type, with a hardly distinguishable or even
identical form, is not at all the same. Apart from the unconscious, emotional
attachment to a tool that was long-tried in the use of one's own hand there are
physical distinctions which are to be respected: the grip of the fist around the smoothworn handle of the trowel, the unmistakable notch in the wood, the hardened rest of
cement on the crank. And then there is the peculiarly ground edge on the metal,
shaped by the countless individual movements of smoothing layers of plaster. The
weight of the heavy, wet material in need of been being tossed exactly at the right
spot requires a well-balanced tool which is suited to allow for that single unerring
tilted hurl by the wrist. With another trowel – that is as if one had to change tennis
racks in the middle of a match. A mason knows immediately whether he is holding his
own or another man's tool in his hand.” (Selle 1997)

The terms experience and behaviour in the definition of psychology are polar and
complementary terms at their extremes. Superior to them is consciousness which includes
the unconscious. There are transitions between conscious and unconscious processes,
wherein the unconscious captures activities that exist in reality, but are not attended by
consciousness (Städtler 2003: 1132f.).
At the centre of consciousness between the pair of polar opposites experience and
behaviour, stands the ego with its integral parts of the unconscious's super-ego and id. The
ego is the centre of experience and behaviour (Scharfetter 1991: 61), or the core of
consciousness, which everything refers to. The terms ego-proximity and ego-distance are to
designate the distance of contents of consciousness to the core of consciousness. Relations,
as described in the example with the trowel, can be deciphered for an analysis of experience
through intentionality. The term intentionality refers to the basic characteristic of
consciousness to always relate to something. In doing so, it is entirely irrelevant for
consciousness whether this reference point is an outer or an inner object (Brentano 1874).
With regards to content, the intentional relationship between Gert Selle and his trowel is
differentiated and rich in the variety of its references. All single intentional events as well as
the intentional relation altogether, hold a considerable positive significance for his ego, from
which the meaning of these events for this ego is derived. The term ego-proximity is meant
to describe the distinctive evaluative aspect of intentional events, which in the given
example carries a positive connotation. Any event with ego-proximity is experienced as a
direct involvement and with a certainty that cannot be doubted.
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From an analytical outside perspective, there are nineteen intentional events in the
description of the trowel experience that are characteristic for direct (pathic) involvement.
One can imagine Gert Selle before he took up his job at the construction site. At that time he
naturally knew that construction sites, trowels and much more existed but he was not yet
personally implicated. All of these held a status of ego-distance. It was experience outside
myself. The number of comparable intentional events to the trowel would be zero. If this
example could be generalized, then the criteria for successful design would be the highest
possible ego-proximity, and ego-proximity would be the categorical imperative of design.
Objects with a status of ego-proximity are integrated into the total individual intentional
multiplicity of relations that a person is capable of. With great ego-proximity the object
becomes an essential part of the person. The objective of ego-proximity in design makes the
personality the reference point or system for customer-oriented and experience-centred
design.

A timeline of engagement with experience
in the history of science
The timeline in figure 1 reveals that experience, or Erleben, appears only once, namely as
psychology of experience (Erlebenspsychologie). This name sums up four trends in
psychology between 1890 and the 1930s. All of them have contributed significant research
on the subject of experience, but in the designations of their respective approaches, the
term experience does not even appear. It is also likely that psychology of experience did not
exist as such, but was instead used by Pongratz (1967) in order to summarize various
psychological schools that had emerged at the time.
Those fields with academic relevance to experience are depicted on the timeline. It can be
noticed that psychology of experience only had a limited historical duration. In other fields
the term experience remained in use. Outside the field of psychology, phenomenology and
psychiatry and psychopathology are to be named. Within the field of psychology, it is
psychology of emotions with its concepts, which researches emotions in relationship to the
entirety of consciousness – for example in the cognitive theories of emotions. A further
example within psychology is the development in modern neurosciences since the 1980s. At
the time it was recognized that emotions and feelings had been scientifically neglected, so
that the period was occasionally referred to as emotional revolution (Dörner & Stäudel 1990,
cf. Städtler 2003). In neurosciences, this interest was fueled by the possibilities of modern
medical imaging, and from then on the number of popular scientific publications on the
subject, particularly on the relationship between the emotions and the brain, has constantly
increased. One of the influent authors is the American neurologist and neurobiologist
Antonio R. Damasio (1994, 1999). His books contains a neurobiological theory of experience
which is classified, however, under the general terms of emotions and feelings: here he
deals with experience as a subject, but it is not labeled as such. Taking into account the older
literature on experience, one will be surprised not to find major findings in today's scientific
mainstream compared to earlier research. Each of these trends, the ones illustrated on the
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timeline being just examples, as well as the psychology of experience, emerged around 1890
(figure 1).

Figure 1 selected concepts of experience in a timeline of history of science

In the psychological schools of experience (including those shown in figure 1 but also others)
before 1950, experience, as in the German word Erleben, was a basic term with a singular
and non-exchangeable significance, used to make sense of life, the world and humans,
including oneself. Looking at the timeline, it becomes clear that not everything that is about
experience is labeled as such, and it has to be added that, not everything labeled as
experience actually refers to experience in that sense. The later statement applies in
particular to the colloquial use of the word in present everyday culture, as has been pointed
out above.
Irrespective of different fields, there existed a common basic understanding about the
phenomena of consciousness and experience during that period. Consciousness was
understood as the collective designation for sensing, perceiving, imagining, thinking,
memory, feelings, motivation etc., thereby including physical processes that one can
become aware of in one's mind. Experience refers to the fact that one can become aware of
this totality of consciousness only through self-reflection, because it can be accessed in its
entirety only by the individual human possessing that consciousness. The one factor or
unifying principle which reveals that experience really is the subject matter, though it may
not be labeled as such, is holism. The term holism (Ganzheit), along with Gestalt, first
appeared in psychology around 1900, and both terms were to some extent used
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synonymously (Pongratz 1967: 286, 301). Holism, the full breadth of consciousness, in that it
contains all capacity for human consciousness, including the unconscious and physical
processes, and the fact that experience is characterized by its direct and implicit
involvement, thus only accessible to the experiencing person, are the most important
attributes in the common understanding of the concept of experience.
It was Wilhelm Dilthey who first coined a valid conceptual formulation for experience as a
process (erleben) and as an event (das Erlebnis). Even after one hundred years his approach
still remains viable. He first formulated an elaborate philosophical and psychological concept
for a scientific theory of experience, one that is based on an empirical foundation and free
from any theoretical presuppositions and transcendental positing (CW I, VI). Dilthey
established the human sciences as an experiential science of cognitive perception and thus
also became the founder of an epistemology of the humanities (Schischkoff 1991: 142). For
him, a psychology of experience is correlated to this purpose and is the empirical
foundational discipline for such an epistemology. Dilthey's empirical maxim is »to strive to
understand life out of itself« (CW V: 4). His superior principle is holism, which he viewed in
relationship to experience more decisively than any other predecessor of the later gestalt
psychology or holistic psychology (Ganzheitspsychologie, Pongratz 1967: 260).
From the year 1883 stems a very concise definition of experience by Dilthey himself that
sums up his approach while giving it concise expression. Dilthey defined: »Experience is
consciousness as it is here for me« (Dilthey 1883/1982, cf. Riedel 1978: 72). For him,
experience is the personal encounter with life of the individual human in his or her
respective society and in the historical context by means of his or her own consciousness
from the inside out. Experience is life, one's own life as well as that of others and of the
world at large from the inner perspective.
Next to holism, temporality is a second defining category for life and experience in Dilthey's
approach. »This life contains temporality as its first categorical determinant which is
foundational to all others.« (CW VII: 192). According to Dilthey, experience is a process (a
stream of events, a happening, a procedure) and not a static seizable event. The temporal
character of this process can be demonstrated through a self-experiment by applying a
mechanical process model, which makes it differ in complexity compared to the real
experiencing. One may imagine the concepts of past, present and future with the intention
to determine with the results of this experiment just what the past, present and future are.
You can start with the present that may be imagined as now. Try as you might, you will not
be able to grasp the contents of either one of these three concepts. If you think that you
›caught‹ the present, it is already gone and has become future, and likewise with the past,
before one has been able to seize it, it has become the present, etc.
Already this simple experiment, despite its simplification compared to reality, hints at
fundamental differences between physical time and experienced, inner time. Common to
both is the observable process effect, which, however, in the ›real‹ and non-simulated
experiencing emerges in a different manner. In the ›real‹ experience, the parts are not
causally connected but, just as in fiction writing, they are connected through content via
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events. »The time which separates and binds them is not measured by clocks but by that
which happens« (CW VI: 221).
The process of experience or experiencing occurs in two structural types: as a structure of
succession and structure of simultaneity (Pongratz 1967: 261). The structure of succession
describes experience as a continually passing process. The structure of simultaneity refers to
everything that happens simultaneously in any given moment of this process. It is like a
cross-section through the structure of succession. Dilthey himself called the structure of
simultaneity a state of consciousness, status conscientiae (CW V: 201ff.). In varying
proportions it contains will, cognition (thinking) and emotions. In figure 2 this structural
correlation is depicted by the interpenetration of the two structural types.
The relationship between the structure of succession and the structure of simultaneity and
their parts is established through contents. Unlike in the self-experiment they are not
formally and causally connected with each other but are connected by a common meaning
of these parts to the whole of greater units of experience and the course of life. Meaning is
an evaluation method which selects, bundles and combines parts according to their
significance in any moment of life in reference to the entirety of the life course. The
essential factor of life is the now as a part of the present in the sequence of past-presentfuture of which it is the center. The now rests upon on the past and is oriented towards the
future. The material that it uses from the past depends on its evaluation in the moment in
reference to the whole of the life course. What has been experienced can lie far in the past
or be very close. The extent to which the now reaches into the future depends on the
meaning of the anticipated goal in the context of greater units of experience and the overall
life course.

Figure 2 simplified scheme of the theoretical framework of Dilthey

Dilthey defined the experience as the smallest unit of the process of experiencing. It is the
smallest unit which possesses a coherent meaning within the course of life. Its structural
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setup is the same as the one of the process of experiencing – a structural parallelism that
also holds for any action as a unit of activity as described by Hacker in his modern theory of
action regulation (1986, 2005).
The permanent effectiveness of both structures takes place unnoticed in the background of
the conscious experiencing and acting for example, as a kind of primal experience. This
primal experience may be imagined by comparing the dreamless state of deep sleep or that
of unconsciousness with a pain-free waking state. In both instances we are alive, but we are
only conscious of it in the waking state. Compared to the other two states, in the latter we
will be able to at least make out a sort of background noise in the interiority of the mind.
This is where experience begins.
Some attributes of the primal experience are
its non-conceptual quality in the sense that it has not yet been conceptually
processed or is not conceptual at all,
its irrevocability and incorrigibility. Thoughts can be revoked and revised,
experiencing and the experienced cannot,
its capacity to accumulate,
its passive and unquestionable character. One is under the impression that it
came into being and exists without one's own efforts or somehow comes from
the outside. Moreover, it gives the sense that what one experiences is in itself
true. Doubt of this being so is only possible through reflection, when one no
longer abides in that state of primal experience,
the certainty that one has experienced it him- or herself
its fugitiveness, frailness and vulnerability (corruptibility in Dilthey's terms,
CW VIII: 79, 140, CW VII: 229, 325).
In the primal experience, it is not details which are captured but greater units of meaning.
Heidegger gave the well-known example of the lectern according to which, upon entering an
auditorium one conceives the lectern not by the number of its brown wood panels, its
geometric or other features but as a whole unit of meaning as the lecturing desk in this
auditorium.
Notable for the primal experience is that within it the subject-object separation of one's
normal and habitual perception seems to disappear; suddenly it does not exist any longer. In
the intentional state of greatest ego-proximity (as in the trowel example) the object
seemingly dissolves in the ego or merges with it.
The primal experience is immediately disrupted by the reflection of consciousness on itself,
which is the reason why it cannot be accessed at the time of its occurrence by the
experiencer him- or herself, as is the case with experiencing in general. Experience that is
describable in speech and written is always based on remembered and reflected experience.
What is called primal experience here should not be confused with the unconscious, for its
characteristic is that it is accessible to the state of conscious being (or consciousness) since
its capacity for consciousness is an inherent attribute.
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All these characteristics taken together reveal that experience is an inner, highly private and
intimate matter. The form of communication of this inner to the outer is the expression.
Leibniz provided a conceptual definition that remains relevant even until today describing an
expression as the ways and means with which the soul conveys what is happening within it
(Schischkoff 1991: 52). Through the performance of expressions, the human is able to assure
him- or herself of his or her own individual existence. The expression also is the interface via
which experience becomes communicable. Expression can mean many different things –
facial expression, gestures, body language or odor, a scientific work, a technical construct,
art, and so forth. For the reader of this article, the expression of experience in the design
object will be of interest.
With the triad of experience – expression – understanding, Dilthey developed a basic model
for a general theory of understanding (hermeneutics, from the Greek word hermeneutiké:
the art of interpretation). This methodology is for him the counterpart to the methodology
of explaining in the natural sciences. In the natural sciences the focus is to reveal
relationships in the form of laws regarding mechanical, causal and deterministic structures
so as to control and predict them. Dilthey's hermeneutic interest lies particularly in literature
and poetry. Also, in general it would seem written text and natural language as the means of
expression are of high scientific interest not just in the field of hermeneutics.
The relationship between experience and expression is immediate because their
characteristics are identical. What is revealed outwardly of the experience is expression. The
expression is the medium by which experience shows itself outwardly. The expression makes
the participating in the experience of the other or others possible. Dilthey formulated
markedly: »Understanding is the re-finding of the I in the you; ...« (CW VII: 191). His
perception scheme for this is: »Only what the mind has created, it will understand.« (CW VII:
148).
During the last years of his life Dilthey began, though never completed, the attempt to
delineate a typology of worldviews based on his concept of experience and on the
methodological triad of his hermeneutic approach. According to his conception, world views
are the result of effort that became historically effective in striving to combine the three
fundamental forces of world-relation – cognition, will and emotionality – into a coherent
interpretation of reality as a whole. It is in this context that the question of experience as a
stable, lasting and fashion-independent basic term in the design appears. Several reasons
may account for the cessation of the psychology of experience which is shown as the freestanding white block in the lower middle of the timeline. Later on, the psychology of
experience was labeled as typically German and stigmatized as a philosophical, speculative,
subjectivistic and ultimately unscientific psychology (Pongratz 1967: 255).
From 1913 onwards, psychology of experience was accompanied by behaviorism, which had
emerged in the United States. The school of behaviorism was historically the most important
school of psychology and dominated academic psychology worldwide up until the cognitive
revolution in the 1960s (Städtler 2003: 115). Behaviorism was the attempt to explain the
human as well as the animal by biological mechanisms that can be observed, registered and
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measured from an outside perspective. In its first and most radical phase, consciousness was
not taken into account at all. Also other familiar concepts such as perceiving, imagining,
thinking, wanting and feeling had to be dropped (Pongratz 1967: 312). Two trends in
psychology with comparable goals, one being the so called psychology of consciousness
(Bewusstseinspsychologie), which historically preceded psychology of experience, and the
other being behaviorism, form a temporal frame around the psychology of experience.
Psychology of consciousness was the first scientific psychology as such. With its emergence,
psychology liberated itself from philosophy to become a discipline of its own. Psychology of
consciousness arose from 1850 onwards in Germany following the standards of the
successful sciences, with physics being its vanguard. Its research aimed at discovering causal
laws of nature in the psyche through experiment, as had been done in physics with
inanimate nature.
Conclusively, it is altogether likely that the psychology of experience became the victim of
ideological prejudice and the temporal framing of positivist and rationalist trends in science.

The term experience and its structure
Measured by the citation rate in the course of history since the 17th century, the most
popular approach to verify experience as a basic term has been the method of doubt
employed by mathematician and philosopher René Descartes (1637). Descartes asked
himself what it is that he can know to be true, since he is able to doubt everything. He finds
that everything can be doubted, the world as perceived by the senses, even god – but he
cannot doubt that it is he himself who doubts. What he is left with is cogito ergo sum (I
think, therefore I am), a conclusion which he arrives at by having applied his capacity for
thinking according to the laws of logic and by drawing on his entire knowledge base. But the
Cartesian cogito ergo sum may also be interpreted as I have consciousness, or I have a soul,
therefore I am (cf. Eckhard 2010: 36, Husserl 1985: 147f.). The cogito ergo sum of Descartes
includes any »I perceive, I remember, I fantasize, I reason, I feel, want, will. The I or self that
all these properties refer to or that lives inside them in various ways: active, suffering,
spontaneous, receptive or otherwise behaving« (cf. Husserl 1985:1 48), is the content of
cogito ergo sum.
When applying the core characteristics of experience, including in particular the structure of
simultaneity and the attributes of the primal experience, an interpretation of the cogito ergo
sum as I experience, therefore I am is entirely plausible. Interpreted in the sense of
experience, the cogito ergo sum is given a much wider scope of meaning and becomes
inclusive of the faculty of cognition as in I think, as well as the will and the emotions. The
various interpretations of Descartes« cogito... were apparently caused by the then current
interests in the prevailing socio-historical environment. In the context of Kant's
epistemology which has a strong influence well into the present, as well as the
accomplishments in mathematics and natural sciences since the 17th and 18th century, the
reading of cogito as thinking would be the »correct« one at the time.
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Karl Jaspers (1883–1969) called the certainty regarding experience that Descartes found
basic knowledge. This is the knowledge which »... is the prerequisite for all other
knowledge«, and it »... is also called a priori. As such, it is the universal a priori of
consciousness per se …«, »it is the historical a priori of the present humanness in its world as
it has passed down in tradition, [with each individual human being] as a unique gestalt, as
an incarnation of the general, gaining its meaning and weight not through the general but
from the infinite This.« (Jaspers 1913/1948: 275). This general a priori from Jaspers, this
fundamental knowing regarding the nature of one's own existence, was described by the
mathematician and philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) in his phenomenology as an
essential attribute of the human species (Husserl 1985). With this distinction, Husserl carries
on Descartes' approach but also considerably transcends him methodologically. In the
movement of existentialism in the 20th century (with Jaspers, Heidegger, Sartre, Camus
being some of its proponents for example) this a priori was the fundamental certainty from
where all philosophising started.

A Structural model of experience
From the above it may be concluded that experience is the comprising designation for the
common, daily, significant as well as insignificant, mostly private, unforeseen processes of
consciousness that unceasingly occur within our minds as an unbroken stream of content.
Experience is the world, as perceived in the interior of one's mind, including the perceiver
himself. Experience is the most comprehensive term for everything we perceive in our
minds.
However, experience is a very wide-ranging concept which comprises the entire being of the
human with his or her capacity for consciousness. What has been discussed so far with
regards to the primary features of the concept of experience emphasises this statement. For
daily use, for example in design practice, a readily applicable, universal, stable and lasting
conception of experience is sensible and necessary in order to determine whether that
which is labelled as experience is truly about experience.
Based on what has been presented so far, Dilthey's structure of simultaneity seems to be a
possibility. It describes the makeup and composition of experience in their entirety
according to the characteristics or elements that constitute it, i.e. the thinking, perceiving,
wanting and feeling at a given moment in time. It this, that Dilthey called a state of
consciousness or status conscientiae. In the language of engineering, this model describes
the structural makeup of experience at that particular moment.
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Figure 3 a »compass model of experience« for navigating through experience

Because of its function for navigation and finding out whether that which is labelled as
experience is truly about experience, this structural model may serve as a »compass model
of experience« (figure 3).
The structural model has been derived from the classical theories of capacity in the Western
world which comprise age-old experiences and reflections of humanity on its existence
(Eisler 1904, Städtler 2003, et al.). Here, the model is referenced to Dilthey and will
subsequently be outlined in further detail in its historic context.
The theories of capacity start from the fact, that as of old, humans have contemplated
whether and how their psychic abilities, or in modern terms, cognitive capacities, can be
structured and classified. In Eisler's philosophical encyclopedia (1904) more than one
hundred authors in Western culture are mentioned in this category since the time of the
Pythagoreans. The most prominent classification for modern times is the one by Johann
Nikolaus Tetens (1736–1807). From him stems the trichotomy of psychic abilities, later
called forces of consciousness, as will (conation or volition), reason (cognition) and feeling
(emotion) (Tetens 1777), which remains valid in psychology up until today. Tetens'
trichotomy was adopted by Kant in his Critiques (Kant 1790).
Before and still during the time of Tetens and Kant, it was assumed that will, reason and
feeling were separate autonomous activities because they were not deducible according to
the principle of sufficient reason. Therefore Kant was able to prioritize reason, whereas he
compared the effects of emotions with diseases. The view of will, reason and emotion as
autonomous activities was overcome at the end of the 19th century. Early experiments in
gestalt psychology, among others, already showed that it was not possible to reconcile this
assumption with the results of the experiments. What they revealed was that no process of
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consciousness consists of pure thought or conception, or pure will or pure emotion alone.
Rather it became obvious that will, reason and emotion are dispositions within one and the
same process of consciousness which also includes the unconscious (Stern 1911/1994). In
this process either one psychic factor will outweigh the others. Hence it is always to be kept
in mind that reason, will and emotion should be treated as separate functions only for
analytical or didactic purposes. If the compass-model is applied to the reductionist definition
of experience as it is used in contemporary everyday language and culture, one will end up
with an outcome as shown in figure 5. This exaggerated scenario suggests that reason was
almost amputated from experience.

Figure 5 the model applied to contemporary common understanding of experience –
deprived of cognition part

Figure 6 the concept of experience reduced to intellect as practice in functionalism at the time.

2881

Johannes Uhlmann, Christian Wölfel and Jens Krzywinski

Applying the compass model to the doctrine of functionalism, the use of experience, in its
widened definition, would lead to a scenario as depicted in figure 6. Unaware of the fact that
experience in its wholeness effects consciousness at all times, whether one wishes it to or
not, concept and design objectives were directed towards a mere cognitive perception. It
was assumed that design had to be as rational and objectively justifiable as is technology.
Efficacy of emotions was denied except for basic reactions of the sense organs to external
stimuli. Again somewhat exaggerated, figure 6 aims at showing how experience was
understood in the context of functionalism at the time.
In the compass-model in figure 3, instead of reason, will and emotion, their modern day
designations, cognition, conation or volition and emotion are used. The modern term
cognition comprises the entirety of non-emotional and non-volitional functions of the
psyche. It thus refers to those processes that are active in the formulation of understanding
and knowledge, particularly to perception, imagination, thinking, comprehension and
reasoning (Städtler 2003: 544). The terms conation and volition describe psychic functions
connected to the will. They stand for directed psychic activities, for aspirations, drive and, in
general, for desire (Dorsch 2004: 4987). Emotion is the summarising designation for changes
in the psycho-physiological state induced by outer and inner stimuli and/or cognitive
processes (Fröhlich 2002: 148).
The functional feedback relationship between the various parts of the compass-model,
indicated by the reversible arrows in figure 3, may be imagined in such a way that cognitions
embody knowledge material as well as its related processes, which are connected with the
two other parts in a regulatory relationship. The cognitive processes analyse, break down
and singularize. Conation provides the impetus and is the directing faculty for goals and their
variable handling according to circumstances. The emotions are located between them as
evaluative entities, and they have the task to integrate the actions of the person via a
multitude of moderator signals. By means of mechanisms of evaluation and adjustment the
emotions assure the integrity of action which otherwise may be lost as a result of
singularising (Dörner & Stäudel 1990).

Discussion
The aim of this paper was to bridge the historical findings of academic research on
experience with the current debate on product experience and user experience. Especially
before 1945, the English language was not as predominant in academia as it is today. Hence,
the differentiation between the verb erleben and the noun Erlebnis became more attention
then and may enhance current research. Since there were (and are) different academic
disciplines being engaged with the concept of experience using different terminology, there
are theories and findings that are worth being considered relevant for design. Although
Freud's concept of ego, super-ego and id are discussed controversially (if not disproved as
»non-scientific«), the aspects of the conscious and the unconscious (cf. tacit and implicit
knowledge) are still an issue in current psychological research and may be linked to design
research as well.
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In this paper, a phenomenological model of user experience has been presented, which was
derived especially from the Work of Dilthey in the early 20th century. This model can be used
to understand and describe product experience in a contemporary sense. It does not provide
any assistance for designing or evaluating particular user experiences. However, due to its
similarities with other current models of user experience, it links these to comprehensive
theories in the history of sciences, which engaged with the concept of experience between
the middle of the 19th and the middle of the 20th century.
Acknowledgements: The authors wish to thank Martina Dietrich, who helped to
translate parts of this paper from German language.
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